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Why it is important for Canada and the EU to reach an ambitious agreement,
and how it can be achieved. 
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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICYA comprehensive economic and trade agreement (CETA) between Canada and the
European Union (EU) is both desirable and possible. For Canada, an agreement with the
EU is a strategic opportunity to significantly diversify the market for its high-value-added
goods, services and skills, to increase the attractiveness of its economy for investors, and to
make a statement that it is ready to engage with other important trade partners on reducing
barriers to mutually beneficial trade and investment. This is important in light of both the
failure of the Doha round of WTO talks and the existence of other important trade
negotiations undertaken by Canada’s key trade partners.
A meaningful and mutually beneficial agreement will require bold steps on the part of
Canada and the EU. This is due to the nature of the Canada-EU relationship, which is
more intensive in services, investments, and sophisticated manufactures than that between
Canada and other economic partners. In this context, key issues include better mutual
access to public procurement contracts, protection of intellectual property rights, enhanced
mobility of skilled personnel, and non-discriminatory regulation, in addition to the more
traditional trade issues such as agricultural and industrial tariffs. 
Many of these issues involve provincial and territorial governments, who are for the first
time at the negotiating table with the federal government. These issues can all be addressed
in the CETA in a way that opens valuable opportunities for EU and Canadian businesses
and individuals in each others’ marketplace, while improving access by Canadian
businesses and governments to EU goods and services that could help reduce their costs,
and thus become more competitive or offer better services.
These objectives can be achieved without compromising the ability of Canada and the EU
to pursue public policy objectives or to regulate for the benefit of their constituents. In
addition, talks with the EU on issues such as government procurement and mobility of
personnel will support Canadian provinces and territories in meeting their past
commitments to streamline Canada’s own internal market. For these reasons, Canada
should seize the strategic opportunity presented by the CETA negotiations to produce a
meaningful agreement across the range of issues under negotiation. Inability to do so
would risk confining Canada’s economic horizons increasingly to home. 
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and Trade Agreement (CETA)
between Canada and the European
Union (EU), under way since 2009,
are the most far-reaching trade talks
commenced by Canada since the
signing of the North American Free
Trade Agreement in 1992. This
report assesses the importance of the
negotiations, reviews key issues under
discussion, and proposes approaches
that would be beneficial to Canada
and the EU as they strive to meet
their early 2012 target for an agreement.
A comprehensive and leading-edge trade
agreement between Canada and the EU is desirable
and possible. Indeed, the size and sophistication 
of the market represented by the EU – whose
GDP exceeds that of the United States – and the
importance of services and investments in the
Canada-EU relationship suggest that a comprehensive
agreement would open new doors for Canada
beyond its traditional resource and manufacturing
base. The agreement would also benefit Canadian
consumers, governments and their agencies, as
well as firms that use EU inputs in their Canadian
operations, by increasing the availability of EU
goods and services in the Canadian marketplace. 
But getting there will require some bold steps
on Canada’s part. Trade negotiators are contemplating
a progressive agreement, in which both parties
remove or begin to remove most remaining
barriers to fruitful bilateral economic relations.
The main advantages of the proposed agreement
will only materialize if the EU, the Canadian
federal government and the provinces, who are for
the first time taking part in international trade
negotiations, can open doors in important areas
that have traditionally been closed, smooth out
unnecessary differences in standards that hinder
beneficial exchanges, and, in the process, remove
some impediments to trade within Canada’s own
economic union. 
Below, I review key issues in the negotiations
and establish criteria that will enable an evaluation
of whether the ambitious objectives enunciated by
Canada and the EU are ultimately achieved.
Canada’s need to complete this ambitious agenda
is particularly evident in light of (i) the failure of
the Doha round of World Trade Organization
(WTO) negotiations and (ii) the progress the EU
is making on other trade fronts. The EU has
signed advanced trade liberalizing agreements with
other trading partners of importance to Canada
(Mexico, South Korea, Caribbean), and is seeking
deals with others (such as India, and eventually
the United States). As it is, Canada has a significant
backlog of unfinished trade negotiations and is
currently not at the table of the important 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations.
1
Many of these existing or proposed agreements
among important Canadian trading partners aim
to facilitate trade in high-value-added manufactures
and services and foster mutually beneficial cross-
border investments between them. The danger for
Canada in this context is that failure to reach an
agreement with the EU – or reaching an
agreement that might look comprehensive in the
range of topics it addresses but only make shallow
progress in each – would end up reducing Canada’s
influence and attractiveness in global trade outside
the resource sector.
The author would like to thank Philippe Bergevin, Colin Busby, Ben Dachis, Armand de Mestral, Jason Langrish, Alexandre Laurin, 
Finn Poschmann, Bill Robson, and other reviewers who wish to remain anonymous, for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
The author alone is responsible for any remaining errors.
1 The Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations between Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and
Vietnam seek to produce a comprehensive agreement covering many of the issues also at stake in the Canada-EU CETA, such as regulatory
issues, government procurement and intellectual property. | 2 Backgrounder 143
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The Nature of the Canada-EU 
Economic Relationship
The key issues at stake in this agreement can be
appreciated by highlighting important qualitative
differences between the Canada-EU relationship
and Canada’s trade with many of its other
economic partners. Overall, the total value of
Canada’s bilateral trade with the EU each year is
$104 billion, accounting for just over 10 percent
of Canada’s international trade flows. However,
trade in services accounts for a larger part of this
total than for trade between Canada and the
United States, and between Canada and all other
countries on average (Table 1). This is true even
when one removes transportation and travel
services and looks only at commercial services
such as R&D, financial, computer, management
or engineering services – a broad category
encompassing a number of relatively high–income
jobs and which accounts for a small but steadily
growing share of world trade.
2 As well, a relatively
high share of Canada’s merchandise trade with the
EU is comprised of machinery and equipment
and consumer goods.
3
Furthermore, relative to the size of their cross-
border trade flows, Canadian and EU firms have
made sizeable direct investments in the other’s
market (Table 1). Indeed, the EU is the second-
largest source of foreign direct investment in
Canada, after the United States.
4 A large amount
of Canada-EU business is thus conducted through
affiliates on the ground (see Table 1), providing
employment both in the host market and in head
offices in the home country.
5
This economic relationship explains why
negotiations now under way cover far more than
tariffs and other barriers imposed at international
borders. Success in foreign markets for services,
public procurement contracts, or sophisticated
consumer goods often requires personal contacts
and a keen understanding of standards, regulations
and other in rules of the domestic marketplace. 
In turn, this often requires a corporate presence in
the market being served, and ease of movement of
key personnel and information between the home
office and affiliates abroad. 
In this type of relationship, difficulties that
firms and persons can encounter in meeting the
host jurisdiction’s standards, in protecting their
property rights, in participating in services and
public markets on similar terms as those afforded
domestic firms, or in sending their key personnel
abroad, can become important barriers to the
realization of mutually advantageous opportunities.
Thus, the CETA negotiations are aimed not only
at border measures but more generally at reducing
the barriers beyond the border that unnecessarily
limit the ability of nationals of one party to seek
opportunities in the other party’s market.
Because of these issues, Canadian provinces are,
for the first time, actively involved with the
federal government in a number of Canada-EU
negotiating groups.
6 This major innovation will
test whether provinces are willing to support the
expansion of global opportunities for individuals
and businesses located within their jurisdiction, 
2 The share of these commercial services in the value of imports worldwide has risen from 5.1 percent in 1980, to 6.7 percent in 1990, 
7.4 percent in 2000, and 9.0 percent in 2010. Source: WTO Statistics database, retrieved at http://stat.wto.org, and author’s calculations.
Canada registered a global trade surplus in commercial services for the first time in 2010 (Canada 2011, p.41).
3 Non-auto machinery and equipment and consumer goods together accounted for 28 percent of Canada’s merchandise exports to the EU and
51 percent of merchandise imports from the EU in 2010, in both cases higher than comparable numbers in our trade with the United States
and with the rest of the world. 
4 EU direct investments in Canada are valued at C$148.8 billion, compared to $306.1 billion from the US and $106.7 billion from all other
countries combined (Canada 2011b, Table 10). 
5 See Alejandro et al. (2011) for the positive impact of foreign affiliate sales on head office employment.
6 The EU had requested a “meaningful” provincial role in the negotiations, based on the fact that many issues involve areas under provincial
jurisdiction, including of course provincial and municipal procurement. See Kukucha (2010), p 5.Backgrounder 143 | 3
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Table 1: Broad Patterns of Trade and Investments between Canada and Selected Regions
Source: Statistics Canada CANSIM tables 376-003, 376-0061, 376-0037, accessed September 13, 2011 at http://cansim2.statcan.gc.ca; 
and author’s calculations.








Share in Total Canadian Exports (Goods + Services) 10.3 70.4 19.3
Share in Total Canadian Imports (Goods + Services) 10.9 61.8 27 .3
Services Exports as percent of Total Exports to Region 25.8 11.5 18.5
Exports of Commercial Services 12.6 7. 5 10.8
Canada FDI to Region as percent of Canadian Exports 
to Region
296.6 74.6 240.7
FDI in Canada from Region as percent of Total Canadian
Imports from Region
229.9 97 .5 48.6
Canada Foreign Affiliate Sales as percent of Total Canadian
Exports to the Region (2009)
167.3 68.2 158.4
by reciprocally allowing greater access to public
procurement opportunities or provincially
regulated markets for EU entities or persons.
In this context, Canada and the EU have
professed a high degree of ambition for their
proposed CETA. But if both parties are to deliver
on this ambition, a number of key issues will have
to be addressed before the early 2012 target for
completing the negotiations. I now turn to a brief
discussion of each issue.
Trade in Goods
There are significant opportunities to increase
access in the EU market for Canadian grains, beef,
pork, and seafood products. In exchange, the EU
will naturally look for greater access to the
Canadian food market, notably in supply–
managed sectors that include dairy, poultry and
eggs. For Canadian consumers in particular, it
would be desirable for Canada to relax its current
tight controls on the supply of dairy and other
supply-managed products that currently keep
prices in Canada several times higher than world
prices. For example, there is nothing preventing
Canada, within the current system, from increasing
the quantity of EU dairy products allowed in
Canada at low rates of duty.
7 Although Canada
could instead try to gain greater access to the EU
market for food products by offering concessions
in other areas, both partners should further open
their agricultural trade in line with their respective
7 This could be accompanied by the auctioning of new production quotas at home, as suggested by Busby and Robson (2010).| 4 Backgrounder 143
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sectors of comparative advantage. This would
benefit farmers in these sectors, consumers, and
food-processing industries. Canada would also
gain in credibility vis-à-vis other potential partners
if it were to move towards agricultural trade
liberalization in its talks with the EU.
8
In general, tariffs on non-agricultural goods, of
which a number remain, should be eliminated and
rules of origin highly simplified between the two
parties. They should be made as coherent as
possible with rules that Canada and the EU each
observe in their agreements with third parties, in
recognition of the fact that manufactured goods
are increasingly “made in the world” rather than in
any one jurisdiction. Specifically, the agreement
with the EU should recognize the high degree of
integration of the North American automobile
industry. For example, the EU could allow a 
tariff-free quota for cars and parts that contain
significant Canadian content but that meet
NAFTA, rather than strictly Canadian-EU, rules
of origin. 
Regulatory Standards
How regulatory standards are adopted and applied
is relevant to trade in goods as well as services. A
key question is whether the EU should have the
right to block a Canadian product from entering
the EU based on the process through which it is
made, rather than based on the product intrinsically
posing a health, safety, or environmental hazard in
the country in which it is used.
9 Unless the
production or trade of a product is restricted
under accepted international agreements, Canada
and the EU should provide mechanisms for issues
to be resolved in the first instance without recourse
to trade restrictions, focusing on other means to
address any concerns, such as agreeing on labeling
and other means of informing potential
purchasers of a product. At a minimum, Canada
should obtain guarantees that any restriction on
the sale of a Canadian good or service in the EU,
imposed a a result of concerns about the process
by which it is produced, should apply proportionately
to all non-Canadian products in the European
market using processes that would cause a similar
impact. In short, Canada and the EU need to find
mechanisms to address these issues in a fact-based,
non-discriminatory fashion that treats government-
imposed trade restrictions as a last resort. 
Finally, Canada and the EU should seek as
much as possible to dovetail such cooperative
mechanisms on regulatory questions with
mechanisms that each has in place to improve
regulatory cooperation with the United States.
The aim should be to provide for mutual
recognition where possible, avoid arbitrary,
discriminatory decisions by regulatory authorities,
and eliminate small regulatory differences that are
not necessary to meeting policy objectives. 
Intellectual Property (IP)
The majority Canadian government elected in
May 2011 should be able to pass a long overdue
copyright bill that will address most of the concerns
of Canada’s trade partners – and of Canadians – in
the important area of intellectual property (IP).
On enforcement of IP, Canada and the EU are
both signatories to the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA), which makes it the best
forum to mutually address these concerns.
Patents are a challenging issue.
10 Many EU
firms, such as pharmaceutical companies, are large
patent-holders and want more protection – i.e.,
higher value – for these patents than is offered
under the current IP regime in Canada. They are
thus requesting that Canada increase the effective
period of market exclusivity in Canada for
8 Canada’s absence at the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiating table, for example, is widely seen as resulting in significant part from
Canada’s perceived inability to provide additional market access for supply-managed commodities. See Dawson (2011 forthcoming). 
9 These types of issues have affected trade in seal products and beef products and may now affect trade in petroleum. 
10 For a review in the Canada-EU context, see Morin (2011).Backgrounder 143 | 5
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patented products to that in effect in the EU, or
for that matter in the United States or Japan.
While strong patent protection would spur
innovation and employment in some Canadian
industries, patent “thickets” in some other areas
could in some cases prevent the benefits of
innovations from spreading (Brander 2010).
The CETA should bring the effective period of
market exclusivity for patented products up to a
high international standard, but it should also
preserve the ability of governments to adapt their
IP regimes in light of future circumstances and
evidence of their impact. They should also phase
in additional protection so as not to confer an
immediate benefit on existing products but instead
stimulate innovation. The agreement should also
clarify the ability of public authorities to intervene
in the market for patented products, or for patents
themselves, through available competition policy
tools, in the pursuit of legitimate public policy
goals. These include the goal of ensuring that the
patent regime promotes rather than hinders the
spread of useful innovation. Finally, Canada and
the EU could use the occasion of their discussions
on patents to strengthen mutually beneficial cross-
Atlantic research ties. 
Geographical Indications
The EU has an aggressive approach to conferring
exclusive use of a geographical name on makers of
products that have historically originated in a
particular region, to the point that products made
elsewhere from comparable ingredients and using
comparable methods – often undistinguishable
from the original – are not allowed to use the
protected indication at all in their brand name. In
cases where there is truly something unique about
the product’s geographical origin that informs
consumers about the quality of the product, such
as “Evian” or “Valpolicella” (or, in some cases,
“Canadian”) or if, conversely, an indication is used
fraudulently to mislead consumers about the
quality or origin of a product, then Canada should
support the protection of geographical indications
through its trademark system. In some cases,
Canada might confer on the name of a product
linked to a particular European area, but which is
already used in good faith in Canada in a generic
sense or in translation, additional protection
through the exclusive use of an “original” label.
But there is no reason for Canada to support
exclusive European use of geographic indications
for names that refer to processes rather than to a




A key goal of mutually opening up government
procurement markets is to help governments
provide good value to their constituents in the
provision of public services, through the purchases
of goods and services produced competitively in
the private sector. Up until recently, however,
Canadian provincial and municipal practices were
largely exempt from international agreements
opening up procurement practices to more
international competition. 
The 2010 Canada-US agreement on government
procurement (Canada 2010) initiated an opening
of doors to sub-federal entities in both countries,
establishing a precedent for a more ambitious
procurement agreement with the EU covering 
sub-federal entities. The European Community-
Switzerland agreement (European Union 2002),
which covers contracts awarded by Swiss sub-
federal entities (including districts, municipalities
and companies owned by the public sector) above
a certain monetary threshold and extends the 
type of procurement covered beyond the parties’
obligations under the WTO’s General Procurement
Agreement, provides another good point of
comparison. Naturally, Canada will want
11 For a review of how the EU approach differs from that of the United States, Canada and others and the issues this raises in trade
negotiations, see Hanrahan (2003).| 6 Backgrounder 143
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Canadian firms to also have access to sub-federal
entities in federal EU member states, to ensure a
genuine balance of opportunity to bid on
contracts.
An easily and mutually accessible public
tendering marketplace should be the goal in both
Canada and the EU. Indeed, a logical consequence
of reducing public procurement barriers with the
EU is that provinces may, in order to secure
greater access for Canadians in Europe, have to
find renewed enthusiasm for reducing remaining
barriers within Canada, for example by pressing
on with the wider use of electronic tendering
under the aegis if the 1994 Agreement on 
Internal Trade.
12
A number of Canadians have expressed concerns
that public procurement provisions in a Canada-
EU CETA would severely limit the ability of
Canadian governments at all levels to specify that
public contracts should be awarded to Canadians,
or at least stipulate conditions related to local
employment, for example. Many also see these
provisions, combined with services liberalization
provisions and the possibility that the agreement
may include NAFTA-like protection for investors,
as a “stalking horse” that will force Canadian
governments to, in effect, turn public services
permanently over to commercial operators.
13
While it is true that provisions that open up
public procurement to greater European
competition will by definition mean that some
firms and individuals will face more competition
in vying for local contracts, a strong CETA should
open up equivalent opportunities for Canadians
in Europe, at a net benefit for taxpayers on both
sides of the Atlantic, and for Canadian firms seeking
to grow beyond the confines of the relatively 
small Canadian market. These growth prospects
have been limited by Canada’s lack of offers to 
its trading partners regarding its sub-federal
procurement markets.
For example, the result of excluding provincial
procurement from the NAFTA has been that
Canadian firms were affected by the domestic
purchasing requirements of the American
Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009, and it took
special negotiations with the United States leading
to the above-mentioned agreement to partially
reverse that mistake. In any event, the CETA
provisions on procurement will only apply to
contracts above certain thresholds, and the
likelihood is that there will continue to be some
exemptions for small business and regional
development – though in those areas the agreement
should at a minimum require more transparency
and reporting on how legitimate public policy
objectives, such as regional development, are
actually achieved by exemptions.
Fears that the CETA will prevent governments
from regulating or even operating public services
are likely not well founded. One should look at
comparable experiences before concluding that
governments will lose control over public services
or their right to regulate – there is no record of
that having been the experience of Switzerland
and the EU, for example. The right of governments
to regulate in a non-discriminatory way without
having to compensate for incidental loss of profits
is well established in international law, including
in a NAFTA context (OECD 2004).
The likelihood is that the thrust of an agreement
will be that if the Canadian private sector is
allowed to bid on contracts over a certain amount
tendered by the public sector, government
agencies, or government-owned corporations,
European entities should be allowed to bid on
equal terms, and that Canadians will be offered
equivalent opportunities to bid on European
12 The current state of progress on reducing internal Canadian barriers to public procurement and labour mobility in Canada under the AIT
can be found in the sectoral chapter reports in the AIT annual reports. The annual reports can be found at: 
http://www.ait-aci.ca/index_en/reports.htm.
13 See, for example, Sinclair (2011).Backgrounder 143 | 7
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contracts. Both the added competition to provide
services and the new opportunities in the immense
European market will benefit Canadians.
Services
A competitive service sector is of vital importance
in supporting high value-added jobs within global
value chains.
14 Canada and the EU should make
progress on this issue by going beyond exiting
WTO commitments in lowering barriers to
investment in each others’ territories for service
providers and allowing them greater access to
public procurement, to the extent this can be
done without limiting government’s ability to
enforce regulations and to attain legitimate public
policy objectives. Canada and the EU have agreed
to use a “negative list” approach to negotiating
services liberalization (i.e., all sectors will be
covered except those listed), as opposed to a
“positive list” (listing the type of services that the
parties commit to liberalize). The negative list
should take longer to put together – in particular
as this is a novel approach for the EU – but will
be more effective in that it will encompass an
ever-increasing share of services over time.
Movement of Business, Skilled and
Professional People
Canada and the EU are seeking to expand the
ability of their citizens and businesses to conduct
transactions with each other that require the
movement of personnel. In particular, the
agreement should assist in the intra-company
movement of skilled workers – the purpose is 
to encourage mutually beneficial temporary
movement of citizens, not modify policies
affecting permanent migration.
An agreement should not lower the standards
required of professionals and skilled people
operating in any jurisdiction, but there needs to
be increased transparency and accessibility regarding
examinations, testing or apprenticeship procedures
required to meet standards in an EU or Canadian
jurisdiction. On this question, the federal
government should insist on the provinces and
territories completing the mutual recognition of
skilled trade qualifications and professional
designations, as agreed in the 1994 Agreement on
Internal Trade (AIT), and work with the provinces
to expand the list of those covered by this agreement.
Going further, a dynamic process to encourage the
mutual recognition of qualifications, along the
model of the Québec-France Understanding on
the Mutual recognition of professional qualifications
(Quebec 2008), should be encouraged between
key Canadian and EU jurisdictions.
Conclusion
In summary, an ambitious Canada-EU CETA
would provide a number of benefits to Canada. It
would allow Canadian businesses and individuals
to significantly expand the size of the potential
market for their goods, services and skills, in
particular outside of the resource sectors. It would
allow public entities, through more competition
for public contracts, to find new ways to reduce
costs without reducing services. By requiring
provinces to work together with the federal
government to address public markets, labour
mobility, and other issues over which the
provinces have significant jurisdictions, the CETA
could help spur a more productive Canadian
economic union. 
In a number of areas – agriculture, intellectual
property, public procurement and services, the
CETA also holds the potential for Canada to
introduce changes that will make it a more
attractive trade partner globally, and play a more
constructive role in the post-Doha world, which
will likely be characterized by the continued
mushrooming of multilateral trade agreements
14 This reality is increasingly recognized worldwide. See, for example, Swedish National Board of Trade (2010).| 8 Backgrounder 143
such as the TPP. Even more concretely, since the
EU and the United States do not have a similar
agreement, a CETA could help spur investments
in Canada by European firms seeking improved
access to the US market via Canada.
These advantages will only emerge, however, if
the agreement is a meaningful one. With a bevy of
recent or future regional or bilateral agreements
resulting in a deepening of relationships among
Canada’s trading partners, Canada’s talks with
Europe assume a highly strategic importance.
Canada will need to find the will to expand its
horizons to conclude this deal – otherwise, these
horizons risk being increasingly confined to home.
C.D. Howe InstituteBackgrounder 143 | 9
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